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Critical Legal Studies for the
Intelligent Lawyer
W hat is Critical LegalStudies7 In one sensethat is an uninteresting
question, for CLS (I shall use the
acronym) is nothing more than a
group of friends who share a similar
politics and who got some media at-
tention, like the "brat pack" of
movie fame a few years ago or the
"beat generation" poets of the fif-
ties.' This is particularly true
because much of the media attention
has to do with perfectly normal ruc-
tions associated with the inter-
generational transfer of power and
prestige at the Harvard Law
School. 2 Such ructions are so com-
mon in academic institutions that
there is an "old" proverb to cover
them. "Academic politics is so bitter
because there is so little at stake," it
is said, though when peoples lives
and fortunes get entangled in such
trivia through the tenure process, as
has recently happened at some
schools, then the triviality has got-
ten out of hand.
There is another side to CLS that
might be of interest to practicing
lawyers but which I am not going to
talk about, the side that is a
specialized part of a broad and
diverse movement aimed at loosen-
ing up legal education to find places
for more practical and more
theoretical material. I will not talk
about this side because it is not
distinctively CLS, indeed the move-
ment, now sixty years old, includes
people of all political stripes, from
quite right through quite left. This
movement is based on the assump-
tion that without real theory with
which to approach and understand
* Professor of Law, State University of New
York at Buffalo. This article is an edited ver-
sion of a talk delivered to the Board of Direc-
tors of the Law School's Alumni Association,
February 20, 1987. Thanks should be extend-
ed to them for their hospitality.
' I have previously written about this side of
C.L.S. See Schlegel, "Notes Toward an In-
timate, Affectionate and Opinionated
History of the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies", 36 Stan. L. Rev_ 391 (1984).
2 Evidence in support of this assertion can be
found in the fact that with little more than a
peep the Stanford Law School selected as its
new dean an individual commonly associated
with Critical Legal Studies although the facul-
ty is anything but dominated by members of
the group.
NEWYORK STATE BAR JOURNAL January1988
File fishing
Fishing for information filed under the Uniform Commercial Code
can be tedious and time consuming. Imagine if you could turn to
your own desk-top computer, conduct a thorough online UCC
search and get instant results. Now you can.
After you complete your online search, you will automatically
receive copies of the actual filings for documentation purposes.
InfoseaTch's proprietary database makes online searching for
New York and California UCC information possible today. More
states will follow soon.
So, if you're tired of fishing around, call Daniel Holmes at
800-USA-INFO and ask for your free copy of our latest Online
newsletter. Or fill out and return the coupon.
INFOSEARCH
A Prentice Hall Legal & Financial Services Company




City State Zip Code
Telephone
INFOSEARCH
500 Central Avenue • Albany, NY 12206
NYBJ 188
changes in the practice of law, prac-
tical skills are of, at best, near term
value; that without real practical
understanding with which to inform
theory, such theory is basically hot
air; and that without both theory
and practice, the doctrinal learning
in between is useful for passing a bar
exam and for writing memos for a
few years after law school, but for
little else.
There is a third side to CLS that
is interesting, if not completely new
and different, at least to me, though
whether it is of interest to practicing
lawyers I will leave to my readers to
decide. This is the pure legal theory
that underlies CLS scholarship. To
make some sense out of this theory
one has to go back to the 19th cen-
tury political theory which
undergirds Langdelian Legal
Theory, the dominant legal theory
at the end of the 19th century.
3
All of 19th century political
theory is a part of the tradition of
liberal political theory, meaning not
politically liberal, but not mon-
archist or otherwise elitist. Basic to
this branch of political theory is a
series of inter-related dichotomies:
the distinction between rights and
power; the distinction between ma-
jority rule and tyranny; the distinc-
tion between the passions of in-
dividuals and the interests of
groups; the distinction between
public law, which is seen as coercion
and private law, which is seen as a
matter of consent; and the underly-
ing distinction, basic to legal
thought, between law and politics.
The basic notion is that law is a mat-
ter of rights that respond to interests
and politics is a matter of passion
and power. We sometimes refer to
this as the notion of the rule of law,
the notion of law as rules binding
conduct both of individuals and of
decision makers.
As this political theory works
itself out in the lower reaches of
legal theory as the Langdelians laid
it out, law is the product of the
authoritative premises of the law
and the determinative techniques of
legal reasoning. This theory can be,
and has been caricatured rather easi-
ly as mechanical jurisprudence, but
the design of it is really very straight
forward. And its function is to
assure that in the hands of judges,
and derivatively of lawyers, the
working from authoritative
premises with determinative techni-
que generates single right answers,
answers which thus guarantee that
these non-elected officials carry out
the will of the majority, its interests,
rather than exercise the tyrannical
or corrupt authority of their per-
sonal passions.
In the years between World War
I and World War II a group of law
professors called the American
Legal Realists, participating in the
developments elsewhere in the in-
tellectual world, attacked the 19th
century notion that law is the union
of authoritative premises and deter-
minative technique. Now, a word
about this group of people. First,
they all accepted the 19th century
world of political theory and its col-
lection of interrelated disjunctive
definitions. Second, they all were
deep and abiding democrats, not in
the party sense, but in the small "d"
sense. Third, their politics was in
fact left of center; they all were New
Deal Democrats. The Realists' argu-
ment was two-fold. First they
asserted that the premises were not
authoritative, that, infact, the
premises of law are contradictory
and contrasting, determinative of
nothing, and more importantly
3 A word needs to be said about what
follows. It is often said that C.L.S. is not a
school of thought but rather a movement, a
diverse group of individuals pursuing related
projects. There is some truth to this observa-
tion, and some falsity as well. The falsity is to
be found in my ability to tell the story that
follows; the truth, in that many if not most of
the individuals prominently associated with
C.L.S. would disagree with some or all of my
story and tell different stories. I nonetheless
stick by my story as they would stick by
theirs. For those who would seek a more
diverse and/or detailed understanding of
matters I suggest consulting a selection of the
works found in Kennedy & Klare, A
Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94
Yale L.J. 461 (1984).
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varied with the legal material being
discussed. Second, they asserted
that the technique was not deter-
minative either, that the technical
equipment of the lawyer is varied, is
designed to generate different kinds
of answers, and is highly specific to
individual circumstances.
The important thing to under-
stand about the American Legal
Realists is that, however bright
these academics may have been,
they did not understand that, by
arguing that the technique was not
determinative and that the premises,
not authoritative, they were, in ef-
fect, undermining the entire struc-
ture of liberal political theory. They
did not understand that all of a sud-
den they were opening the theory up
to the claim that nothing constrains
judicial decision. Such an opening is
important because it allows radical
democrats to argue for the direct
political control over the judiciary,
as is the case with other officials like
legislators who are known to be
subject to their passions, and radical
authoritarians to argue for the
superiority of direct administrative,
hierarchical control of the court
system.
The best evidence that the
Realists were not aware of the
revolutionary potential to their
assertions is that they repaired the
system flimsiest of goods. In place
of authoritative premises, they
utilized a notion, live at the time,
that through the aid of science, par-
ticualrly empirical social science,
one could identify the real premises,
the real rules of the system. And in
place of determinative technique,
the Realists similarly argued that
science can generate the facts about
the behavior of the individual in the
legal system, from which informa-
tion one could understand whether
or not the system was operating effi-
ciently and how to improve it.
Of course, there are all sorts of
weaknesses with these notions. Now
we understand that having gotten
the facts about the real premises and
people's behavior, one still has to
ask what the premises ought to be
and how people ought to behave.
But at the time the Realists did not
understand that very well. Never-
theless they created an enormous
amount of noise of which we all are
heirs.
In the late Thirties, especially
after the publicization of the
Doctor's Purge and the slow growth
in our understanding of the threat of
totalitarian government generally,
and Nazism government in par-
ticular, the claim that all this realist
theorizing is anti-democratic was
heard throughout the country. Then
after a brief flap over this claim,
everything disappeared into the
crucible of World War II. On the
other side of this great transfor-
mative event, Realism was gone. In
its place were scholars, largely
centered at Harvard and Columbia
in the late 40s and early 50s, who in
response to implicit realist
arguments, offered a plea in confes-
sion and avoidance. Their claim was
simple. Granted that the premises of
law are not authoritative and the
technique of legal reasoning, not
determinative, nonetheless if one
looks at the legal process, at the way
things customarily go in law, one
finds generally acceptable answers.
In particular, if one looks for
neutral principles, for unbiased star-
ting places, and keeps decision
makers within their proper spheres,
everything will be fine.
The most curious thing about
this group of thinkers, the so-called
legal process school, is how easily
they abandoned the 19th century's
constraint on legal activity, on the
anti-majoritarian character of the
judicial power, and how quickly
they substituted for that constraint a
kind of direct look at its supposed
political results. If the judges stay in
their place, the legislature stays in
its place, and the executive stays in
its place then everything will be
fine, is their argument. And yet it
was just such order that 19th cen-
tury theory was designed to pro-
duce.
In the Sixties that wishful think-
ing began to destruct at an in-
credibly fast pace. The intellectual
critiques were two. The first is one
that any' lawyer would understand
and it is astonishing that such a
good group of lawyers actually
missed it. Anyone knows that
lawyers are good at manipulating
process because process often deter-
mines outcomes. So to say that the
process just jogs along only
rephrases the problem. What kind
of biases are in the process? What
kind of manipulation of outcomes
comes from choosing that process?
The second is something which is
equally easy to come at for a
lawyer. Anyone knows that there
are no really neutral starting points.
Starting points are neutral because
someone says they are neutral, but
they are not neutral in fact for one
gets different outcomes from dif-
ferent starting places. Thus again
were the authoritative premises - the
neutral principles - and deter-
minative techniques - the legal pro-
cess - of the law in shambles.
The intellectual destruction of
the legal process edifice was accom-
panied by the general social destruc-
tion of post-war life. Through a
general disinclination towards
American politics in its traditional
form, begins, I think, with, the elec-
tion of John F. Kennedy, this
disinclination is further played out
through the Vietnam War and the
problems that many people had
with our government's defense of
that enterprise. There was abroad in
the land a sense that politics as usual
was no longer acceptable.
At this juncture a group of
young scholars, almost all involved
in late Sixties and early Seventies
law reform and anti-war activity, in
the true euphoria of those days,
began teaching law. Looking for a
theory to explain the times, they ex-
amined what they had been taught,
the legal theories of the legal process
scholars, and they were not pleased.
Disgruntled, they went back to
Realism in a very real sense, back to
NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL January 1988
the notion that the premises of law
are not authoritative and its techni-
que, not determinative and to the
central, though unarticulated, in-
sight of the Realists. Simply stated:
law is politics. The distinction bet-
ween law and politics that is at the
root of liberal political theory is
wrong headed in that law like
politics has significant distributive
outcomes in the world and that is
why people take it seriously.
All of this history is, I think,
rather easy for the intelligent lawyer
to understand. What makes CLS
difficult for such a lawyer is the ex-
planation given for why this is so,
for the identity of law and politics.
This explanation is difficult because
it relies on two great strands in the
intellectual world to which most
lawyers have not been exposed:
Western European Marxism and a
general movement starting in an-
thropology but ultimately linking
up in literary theory called Struc-
turalism or more generally, post-
modernism.
When Americans think of Marx-
ism they think of old fashioned state
socialism on the Russian model.
Americans do not generally realize
that Western European Marxism
killed that traditional Marxism
sometime in the Fifties and Sixties.
Indeed, as an intellectual force old
fashioned state socialist Marxism
probably died with the Hitler-Stalin
pact in 1940. For the intellectuals
that event killed off, once and for
all, the notion that something
wonderful was going on in Russia.
And if that event did not, Russian
the activities in eastern Europe after
World War II culminating in the
crushing of the Hungarian Revolu-
tion did. Marxists in western
Europe attempted to keep their in-
tellectual tradition alive by devleop-
ing a theory to explain how, if a
change in the ownership of the
means of production did not make
world that much better, some other
change might. They came up with
two notions. One was a deep notion
of the importance for socialism of
community based alternatives to
state power. The other notion was
an emphasis on the way that think-
ing makes things true, the way that
ideology, the world picture that we
create of what is normal social
behavior, makes things appear nor-
mal.
The other great strand of con-
temporary intellectual thought that
CLS relies on is Structuralism. It
began with anthropologists trying
to understand what was similar
about differing cultures, but
ultimately linguists trying to under-
stand about language took the
movement over. At the center of
this body of theory is the very sim-
ple insight that words bear no
necessary relation to anything else.
A narrow, hollow, transparent
vessel with a bottom is a glass and
not a cat bLcause we say it's a glass
and not a cat. We could just as well
have all agreed that a glass is called
"cat" and the little funny, furry
thing that I greet in the morning that
goes meow is a "glass". From this
elementary, some might say
idiotically simple, observation these
theorists want to understand how
we come to know what is a glass
and what is a cat. The answer
generally given is that meaning is
only possible in the context of other
meanings. Thus, one knows what a
thing is because of the way it fits
with other things and not because of
its intrinsic properties. A glass is not
a glass because it participates in
"glassness" but because it is not a
"glade" or a "glaze" (linguistic
similarity and difference) and
because it is not a vase or a cup
(substantive similarity and dif-
ference). Thus we come to under-
stand our world in the pattern of
relations that are set by a group of
speakers.
Now anyone can see where the
ideas of European Marxism and
Structuralism begin to come
together. The Structuralists say its a
web of interconnected definitions
that make up our understanding of
the world. And the European Marx-
ists say it is our ideological
understanding of what is normal
behavior that creates the world of
meaning. Both suggest that if one
wants to understand the way things
work in this world one should
notice the way the societies, the
cultures, the sub-cultures put the
pieces of their world together . . .
notice their ideology, their set of
shared definitions.
All of this european scholarship
feeds back into legal theory in a
very straight forward way. One can
easily understand why the premises
are not authoritative and the techni-
que not determinative. Language is
not logically determinative of
anything; it contains no necessary
relationships, and the only thing we
have to put the system together is
language. Thus we create our mean-
ings. The obvious question then is
"Now do people communicate?"
This body of theory answers this
question very simply. We as a
culture, as a group of humans select
from the enormous range of possible
meanings and understandings of the
world those which we will treat as
available, as acceptable, as plausi-
ble. It is not plausible to call a glass
a cup. Similarly although one can
put together a perfectly plausible
argument from the text of the U.S.
Constitution that capitalism is un-
constitutional that argument is not
plausible, not within the bounds of
acceptable discourse. We have
defined our world of argument so
that that is not a sensible argument.
The import of this answer to the
question of communication for
judicial decision-making should be
quite obvious. A judge interprets
the arguments and events in a case
in light of the culture, the collection
of meanings that are commonly
ascribed, in which he or she par-
ticipates. Thus, what one is doing
when one is arguing before the judge
is attempting to establish the normal
(in the sense of normative not in the
sense that that is the way everbody
does or uses it) meaning of events.
This meaning, however, is not
logically determined and thus a
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lawyer is always fighting over, con-
testing meanings. That is why
lawyers can both do things and do
new things. They are working in a
system in which meaning is both in-
determinate as a matter of logic and
yet in some vague sense shared.
The next obvious question is
how do people select the meanings
that words will bear? With this
question Critical Legal Studies
begins to bite at the gut level and yet
in some sense is of the least interest,
because it gives at least three
answers. The first answer is the doc-
trinalist answer, the so-called irra-
tionalist position. The answer to the
question of where these meanings
come from is "no where special".
Law, in the sense of legal doctrine, is
largely unrelated to anything other
than itself. In the words of the
scholarly catch phrase, it is relative-
ly autonomous. Law is a mandarin
culture, the musings of a bunch of
very highly trained human beings
who spin their culture out for their
own benefit. This law is not a great
capitalist conspiracy, it is a group of
people who put together their own
way of thinking about the world,
which way of thinking tends to
legitimate their position and ac-
tivities in the world, to make them
seem normal, acceptable, but that
probably does not entail much in
the way of real world effects other
than to allow people acting in the
world as lawyers and judges and
legislators to sleep better at night
because this way of thinking gives
them a sense that what they are do-
ing is meaningful. Thus, law is
essentially an ideology, a world
view that gives lawyers a sense that
what they are doing is useful and
proper but ultimately is little else.
The second answer to the ques-
tion of how people select the mean-
ings that words will bear may re-
mind people a great deal of old
fashioned Marxism as they
remember it newspaper editorials.
This answer, contrary to the first,
argues that legal doctrine in some
real sense directly aids the social and
economic interest of the ruling
elites. Somehow the lawyers in-
tuitively understand what the needs
of the economy and of these elites
are and thus "tilt" doctrine in the ap-
propriate direction. Thus, while
words have no necessary relation-
ship to things, economic interest in-
forms the meanings that words take.
As an historical matter, the posi-
tion I just described, the one with
the most direct link to old fashioned
Marxist analysis, was the initial
one. The irrationalist position, sure-
ly the dominant one in CLS at this
time, was essentially a response. In
good dialectual fashion, coming
after the thesis and the antithesis,
there is a synthesis and the synthesis
goes is a third answer to the ques-
Continued on Page 64
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tion of how people select the mean-
ings that words will bear.
One can get at this third answer
by noting that there is something
deeply troubling about the irra-
tionalist position. If law is so irrele-
vant, why does everyone care about
it? Something more has got to be at
stake; law cannot just be the book
of bed time stories for anxious, tired
lawyers. Similarly there is
something bewildering about the
more marxist sounding position.
How do lawyers know what the
capitalists need? First, lawyers have
to do something more than just use
a ouiji board. And second, there is
no neat one to one relationship be-
tween economic interest and legal
doctrine; we have changed doctrine
in lots of circumstances and it has
not made a lot of difference. These
two observations lead to a focus on
the lawyer in the legal profession. A
lawyer participates in two worlds: a
world of government and a world of
economics. These are in some sense
the same world and yet are at the
same time different. The lawyer
mediates between these two worlds,
attempts to fuse the pattern of doc-
trine with the pattern of economic
and other understandings, with the
ideology as it were, of the dominant
social actors.
Individuals persuaded by this
notion are concerned about the day-
to-day activities of lawyers - what
do they do, how did they translate
the needs of their clients into doc-
trine, how they re-shape the doc-
trine to fit those needs, how they re-
shape the needs to fit the doctrine.
This is, I think, probably the emerg-
ing corner of CLS, the one average
lawyers do not hear a lot about.
One hears about the irrationalist
side because it assults the
profession's sense of its own dignity.
Those friends of mine who believe
this position love to make really
quite outrageous statements that are
designed to infuriate people. And
one hears a lot about the seemingly
marxist side because its direct
political challenge infuriates conser-
vatives of all stripes, as well as
liberal reformers. But because the
third group has, as of yet,
developed no theory about practice
that might infuriate any one, one
hears little about.
One might, of course, say "Give
them time." That response raises, I
think, the question of why there is
all the flap about CLS since the basic
position is now sixty years old and
the refinements coming out of Euro-
pean thought, hardly threatening to
anyone. At the first and most super-
ficial level the stories in the popular
press tell it all. If something is
wrong at the Harvard Law School
then the barbarians are at the gates.
At the second level, one must
remember that the legal academic
world is very small. Any tempest in
a teapot that small will create lots of
noise.
At a third and more important
level, we are seeing in law
something that we have seen in
other parts of the intellectual world
over the last 35 years or so: the
breakdown of liberal theory. The
claim that law is politics is much
more than a move in an intellectual
game. It is both destabilizing and
worrisome to lawyers. Lawyers do
not think of themselves as doing
politics so that thought is disorient-
ing to people and thus raises all sorts
of phobias . . . "These are
socialists maybe there's a creeping
commie there too". At the same
time, it is not wholly surprising that
the world of the law should begin
to absorb some of the unease that
has been in the world of political
theory in this country for the last
35-40 years. That unease was seen
as the New Frontier, the Great
Society and in all of those "We've
got to rethink that we're doing, the
way we're distributing wealth and
the way that our system operates"
movements that began to appear in
the late Fifties.
At a fourth level is, I think, a
proposition that most of my friends
would not hold, but which I think
has to be faced up to by them at
sometime. Legitimation is not all
wrong. It would be a very strange
church in which all the priests were
atheists. Some people react
negatively to CLS because they
understand that these scholars say
that the old rites, the old sacraments
of the law, don't work and that
assertion is bothersome to them. At
a fifth and last level, there are lots of
people who quite honestly despise
politics and are in law for just that
reason. I don't think one can get
away from this fact. Further, many
people think that communitarian
and socialist politics stinks. This last
aspect to the flap over CLS is of
course fundamental. Most of the
people whom one might identify as
Critical Legal scholars share a
politics that is communitarian, re-
distributionist, often radically
egalitarian, and profoundly adverse
to American domestic and foreign
policy over the last twenty years.
Whether that politics is sensible or
not is, for present purposes, irrele-
vant. But if one is afraid of that
politics then it is not unreasonable
to make a fuss over CLS.
What then is Critical Legal
Studies? A media event, an episode
in the'reform of legal education, a
politics and for the intelligent
lawyer a theory about law that has
both old and new pieces. Hopefully
that theory is thought provoking to
the practicing bar for in a real sense
that theory is directed at the bar as
an understanding of its work.
I 111
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